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Since Mirrlees (1971), the theory of optimal income taxation considers the
design of the optimal redistributive policy when the government cannot con-
dition taxes on (exogenous) skills but only on (endogenous) earnings. The
theory considers perfect frictionless labor markets, and ignores in particu-
lar the possible emergence of (involuntary) unemployment.1 However, many
studies emphasize the deep impact of labor market taxation on employment
(e.g. Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2006)) and more speci￿cally on unemploy-
ment (Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005)).
Moreover, unemployment, and not only low ability, is an important source
of poverty. A more comprehensive theory of optimal redistribution should
thus be developed in an environment where unemployment is a genuine phe-
nomenon a⁄ected by taxation.
In labor market models that take unemployment into account, the level of
employment is determined by labor demand, which is a decreasing function
of the pre-tax wage. In a non-competitive wage-setting and when the intens-
ive margin (the hours-of-work decision) of labor supply is omitted, a change
in tax policy that increases the marginal tax rate without a⁄ecting the level
of the tax reduces the pre-tax wage, thereby increasing labor demand and
reducing unemployment. This is what we call the wage-cum-labor-demand
margin. Intuitively, such a tax change induces that a given increase in the
negotiated post-taxed wage is more costly for the employers. Consequently,
they become more reluctant to concede workers￿wage claims. On the con-
trary, a tax change that increases the level of tax while keeping the marginal
2tax unchanged increases labor cost, thereby unemployment. These properties
have been demonstrated in various theoretical settings: the monopoly union
model (Hersoug, 1984), the right-to manage union model (Lockwood and
Manning, 1993), the matching model (Pissarides, 1998) and the e¢ ciency
wage model (Pisauro, 1991). Empirical evidence that suggests the import-
ance of these e⁄ects has also been put forward in the literature (Manning
(1993), Rłed and Strłm (2002) or Słrensen (1997)). The e⁄ect of the mar-
ginal tax rate on pre-tax wages obtained in these model is also consistent
with the empirical ￿ndings on the elasticity of income with respect to the
marginal tax rate surveyed by Saez et alii (2009). According to them, the
most plausible estimates for the elasticity of earnings to one minus the mar-
ginal tax rate range from 0:12 to 0:4 in the U.S. Whether this elasticity is due
to a labor supply response (as in a Mirrleesian model), to a non-competitive
wage setting response or to tax avoidance has, to our knowledge, not been
investigated yet, and remains an open empirical issue.
Boone and Bovenberg (2004) have made a distinction between unemploy-
ment and non-participation in an optimal redistributive taxation framework
where the government does not observe the skill level of the agents. How-
ever the unemployment risk does depend nor on wages nor on taxation in
their model. Engstr￿m (2009) extends the Stiglitz (1982) two-skill model of
optimal taxation by introducing search unemployment, but with exogenous
hourly wages. Three recent papers (Hungerb￿hler et alii (2006, henceforth
HLPV), Hungerb￿hler and Lehmann (2009, henceforth HL) and Lehmann
et alii (2009, henceforth LPV)) propose a theory of optimal redistributive
taxation with an endogenous risk of being unemployed. In these models, the
3deadweight losses of redistributive taxation are due to responses along the
wage-cum-labor-demand margin and not the intensive labor supply margin.
This chapter proposes a canonical model of optimal redistribution with un-
employment. The model in the next section aims at shedding light on the
di⁄erent mechanisms at work. We ignore participation decisions and welfare
bene￿ts. The section emphasizes also the methodological di⁄erences and
analogies between our simple model and a version of the Mirrlees model that
generates the same responses of pre-tax earnings to taxation. The concluding
section discusses the in￿ uence of our simplifying assumptions on the results,
and discusses how the above-mentioned papers are related to our canonical
model.
2 The canonical model
2.1 Environment
We consider an economy where risk-neutral individuals are endowed with
di⁄erent skill (ability) levels denoted a. The exogenous skill distribution is
given by the continuous density function f (a), de￿ned on the support [a0;a1],
with 0 < a0 < a1 ￿ +1. The size of the population is normalized to 1. Jobs
are skill-speci￿c. A worker of skill a produces a units of output if and only
if she is employed in a type-a job, otherwise her production is nil. This
assumption of perfect segmentation is made for tractability and seems more
realistic than the polar one of a unique labor market for all skill levels.
The government observes only whether an individual is employed or not,
4and if she is, at which wage. The government in particular does neither
observe skills nor the recruiting processes. Hence, taxation is only a function
of wages. A worker of skill a gets a (pre-tax) wage wa and a disposable
income ca = wa ￿ T (wa) if she is employed. Otherwise, she has no income.
On the skill-a labor market, only a fraction L(a;wa) of the f (a) skill-a
individuals ￿nd a job. The function L(:;:) summarizes all the ingredients of
the labor demand behavior needed for our optimal tax theory. The matching
unemployment theory of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides
(2000) provide some micro-foundations for this function. Matching frictions
imply that not all individuals ￿nd a job and not all ￿rms ￿nd a worker. A
zero-pro￿t condition determines the number of vacancies created by ￿rms,
thereby the labor demand function L(:;:) on each skill-speci￿c labor market.
Firms create vacancies until the cost of creating an additional vacancy is
lower than the expected gain of ￿lling it. As ￿rms open more vacant jobs,
congestion externalities decrease the probability for each vacancy to be ￿lled,
thereby the expected pro￿t per vacancy. When wages decrease on skill-a
labor market, ￿lling a job generates higher pro￿ts and ￿rms create more
vacancies. Lemma 1 in LPV shows that it is equivalent to specify a labor
demand function L(:;:) or to specify the underlying matching environment.
Using this equivalence, we specify here the assumptions of the model in terms
of the function L(:;:).
Assumption 1 L(:;:) is de￿ned for skill levels a 2 [a0;a1] and for wages
w 2 [0;a], takes values within [0;1) and satis￿es the following conditions:
i) L(:;:) is decreasing in wages w.
5ii) L(:;:) is increasing in skill a.
iii) The wage elasticity @ logL(a;w)=@ logw is decreasing in wages.
iv) The wage elasticity @ logL(a;w)=@ logw is increasing in skill.
Part i) states that employment is decreasing in wages w. According to
Part ii), more productive workers ￿nd a job more easily for a given wage level.
Part iii) and iv) imply that employment is more sensitive to wage changes
(in terms of elasticity) at high wages and at low productivity levels. These
conditions on L(:;:) are not very restrictive and might seem quite natural
to make. This assumption allows a wide range of functions, for instance the
linear employment function L(a;wa) = a￿wa
a .
We next describe wage setting. On each skill-speci￿c labor market, we
assume that the wage maximizes the￿wage-setting objective￿
U (c;w;a)
def




(w ￿ T (w)) ￿ L(a;w) (2)
The wage-setting objective U (:;:;:) is skill-speci￿c, increasing in disposable
income c ( an employee￿ s welfare depends positively on the after-tax wage)
and decreasing in the pre-tax wage w ( a higher pre-tax wage reduces ￿rms￿
pro￿t and thus labor demand). Various microfoundations can justify the
functional speci￿cation of this wage-setting objective. As in Mirrlees, we
focus on redistribution and consider a setting such that the role of taxa-
tion is only to redistribute income and not to restore e¢ ciency (see section
63.3 and HL for a case where the no-tax economy is ine¢ cient). To obtain
this property, the matching literature typically assumes that wages are the
outcome of a Nash bargain and that the workers￿bargaining power satis￿es
the so-called Hosios (1990) condition.2 Alternatively, the Competitive Search
Equilibrium of Moen (1997) leads also to (2) when search is directed by wages
and by skill. Still another possibility is to assume that a skill-speci￿c utilit-
arian monopoly union selects the wage wa before ￿rms decide about vacancy
creation (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).














@ log(w ￿ T (w))
@ logw
(4)
When the pre-tax wage increases by one percent, the term @ logL=@ logw
measures the relative decrease in employment, while ￿ (w) measures the re-
lative increase in disposable income. At equilibrium, Equation (3) requires
that these two relative changes cancel each other out. The elasticity ￿ (w)
of disposable income with respect to the pre-tax wage summarizes how the
tax system a⁄ects the equilibrium wage.3 A decrease in ￿ (wa), either due
to a higher marginal tax rate or to a lower average tax rate, induces that
a given increase in the pre-tax wage leads to a smaller increase in dispos-
able income. Higher employment probability is then substituted for lower
disposable income in the wage-setting process and so the pre-tax wage sinks.
We ￿nally describe the government￿ s budget constraint. Each of the





w U (w ￿ T (w);w;a) ￿ (w ￿ T (w)) ￿ L(a;w) (5)
be the value of the maximized wage-setting objective for workers of skill a.
Hence, Ua = ca ￿ L(a;wa) and the government￿ s budget constraint4 writes
Z a1
a0
[wa ￿ L(a;wa) ￿ Ua] ￿ f (a) ￿ da = 0 (6)
Given the unemployment uncertainty, individuals of skill a get on average
a pre-tax wage wa ￿ L(a;wa) and an after-tax income Ua. Multiplying the
di⁄erence between the two by the density of workers and taking the sum for
all skill levels gives the government￿ s aggregate revenue.
2.2 Comparison with a Mirrleesian environment
In the ￿frictional￿environment described above, the pre-tax wage decreases
with marginal tax rates. This is because the pre-tax wage maximizes a wage-
setting objective that is increasing in disposable income c and decreasing in
pre-tax wage w. The same property holds in a ￿Mirrleesian￿environment
characterized by no frictions on the labor market, an in￿nitely elastic labor
demand and labor supply responses along the intensive margin. In this clas-
sical framework, a higher pre-tax wage is due to more e⁄ort (less leisure).
Conversely, a higher disposable income increases consumption and pushes up
utility. Therefore, there exist speci￿cations of individuals￿preferences in the
Mirrleesian environment that induce the same responses of pre-tax wages to
8taxation as our frictional environment. Let h denote working time. An indi-
vidual of skill a working h earns w = a ￿ h. Consider then preferences that
are linear in consumption with a multiplicatively separable and skill-speci￿c
utility of leisure v (:;:). So, the utility function equals c ￿ v (a;h). These
preferences can be rewritten as a function of the observables c and w using












. Equations (1) and (7) have the same form but the
economic interpretation of the function L(:;:) is di⁄erent. In the frictional
environment, L(:;:) stands for the probability that an individual of skill a
is employed, whereas in the Mirrleesian environment it captures the utility
of leisure. In both environments, equilibrium wages maximize (w ￿ T (w)) ￿
L(a;w), thereby generating identical responses of wages to taxation. The
di⁄erent economic interpretation of L(:;:) has a crucial consequence: the








M (w ￿ T (w);w;a)
as the value of the wage-setting objective for workers of skill a in the Mir-
rlesian environment. Hence, disposable income veri￿es ca = UM
a =L(a;wa).















￿ f (a) ￿ da = 0
9In this environment, deadweight losses are minimized whenever wages
wa maximize tax revenues per individual of skill a for a given value of the
wage-setting objective. In the Mirrleesian environment, e¢ ciency, i.e. the
situation where deadweight losses are minimized, requires a zero marginal
tax rate.5
In the frictional environment, a change in wages a⁄ects the level of taxes
paid by employed workers, wa ￿ Ua
L(a;wa), exactly as in the Mirrleesian envir-
onment. However, it also a⁄ects the fraction of taxpayers L(a;wa). Hence,
expected tax revenues per individual of skill a equal waL(a;wa)￿Ua. So, the
deadweight losses associated to taxation are minimized whenever the average
pre-tax wage waL(a;wa) per individual of skill a is maximized. E¢ ciency
therefore requires that the elasticity ￿ (wa) of disposable income with respect
to wages is equal to 1, that is the marginal tax rate is equal to the average
tax rate (see Equation (4)). Consequently, when the average tax rate is pos-
itive (negative), the e¢ cient level of the marginal tax rate is also positive
(negative).
2.3 Social optimum
We henceforth only consider the frictional environment. The government
is ready to compensate individuals for their innate heterogeneous ability.
To formalize this idea, we consider a social objective which consists in an





￿(Ua) f (a) da (8)
10The government aims at maximizing its objective subject to the budget con-
straint (6) and the choices made by the agents. The government does not
observe the productivity of each job but only the wage negotiated by each
worker-￿rm pair. Since a worker-￿rm pair maximizes the wage-setting ob-
jective U (c;w;a) that is increasing in c, one can apply the Mirrleesian meth-
odology to solve the optimal tax problem.
The taxation principle (Hammond 1979, Rochet 1985 and Guesnerie 1995)
applies. So, the set of allocations induced by a tax system T (:) through the
wage-setting equations (2) corresponds to the set of incentive-compatible al-
locations fwa;ca;Uaga2[a0;a1] that verify
8(a;b) 2 [a0;a1]
2 U (ca;wa;a) ￿ U (cb;wb;a) (9)
This condition expresses that a worker-￿rm pair of type a chooses the bundle
(wa;ca) designed for her, rather than any other bundle (wb;cb) designed for
worker-￿rm pairs of any other type b. From Assumption 1 iv), the strict
single-crossing condition holds. Hence, (9) is equivalent to the envelope con-
dition associated to (2)




and the monotonicity requirement that the wage wa is a nondecreasing func-
tion of the skill level a. We consider the so-called ￿rst-order approach that
considers the￿relaxed￿problem without the monotonicity constraint.6
Hence, the government￿ s problem consists in ￿nding an allocation a 7!
11fwa;Uag that maximizes the social objective (8) subject to the government￿ s
budget constraint (6) and the incentive constraint (10). Taking the wage
as the control variable and the expected utility as the state variable,7 the
optimal tax problem can be solved using the Hamiltonian
H(w;U;a;￿;q)
def




where ￿ is the multiplier associated to the government￿ s budget constraint
and q is the co-state variable associated to the incentive constraint. It is
convenient to use Za = ￿(qa ￿ Ua)=￿. Then the ￿rst-order conditions of the
government￿ s problem are (10) and
@ (waL(a;wa))
@w
￿ f (a) =
@2 logL
@a@w
(a;wa) ￿ Za (11a)






￿ Ua ￿ f (a) (11b)
Za1 = 0 (11c)
Za0 = 0 (11d)









￿ Ut ￿ f (t) ￿ dt (12)
These relations describe the equity-e¢ ciency tradeo⁄ made by the gov-
ernment. To see the intuition behind this optimality condition, we focus
on the optimization problem for agents of type a and consider a marginal
increase in their wage. The incentive constraint (10) implies that the value
12of the wage-setting objective for workers of skill a, Ua, is predetermined and
not a⁄ected by the change in the wage wa.
The left-hand side of Equation (11a) stands for the e¢ ciency part of
the trade-o⁄. An increase in the wage rate wa decreases the probability of
being employed, so the impact on the average pre-tax wage waL(a;wa) per
individual of skill a is ambiguous.
The right-hand side of Equation (11a) represents the impact on inform-
ational rents of a higher pre-tax wage for type-a workers. When jobs of
productivity a are better paid (while keeping Ua ￿xed), a wage-setter of type
t > a ￿nds it pro￿table to choose the wage wa designed for type-a jobs instead
of the wage wt designed for her. To prevent this ￿mimicking￿ , the value of the
wage-setting objective for type-t jobs has to grow. Using Equation (10), the
term in front of Za on the right-hand side of (11a) measures by how much the
rate of change of the skill-speci￿c value of the wage-setting objective _ Ua=Ua
has to grow when wa marginally increases. From Assumption 1 iv), this term
is positive.
The incentive-compatibility constraints will remain satis￿ed if all jobs
with a productivity higher than a bene￿t from an equivalent relative increase
in their wage-setting objective. For any type t above a, this relative increase
times Ut gives the rise in the wage-setting objective. Each unit of the latter
generates an increase in the social welfare measured by ￿0
t and implies a
budgetary cost equal to ￿. Aggregating these two terms between a and a1
and dividing by the cost of public funds gives (12).
The intuition behind Equation (11d) is the following. A unit relative
increase of the wage-setting objective spills over the whole skill distribution
13and its e⁄ect is proportional to Za0. At the optimum, this change must have
no ￿rst-order e⁄ect, so Za0 has to equal zero.
We henceforth use the words ￿optimal - optimality￿to characterize the
solution to the government￿ s problem. We get the following proposition:
Proposition 1 i) For each a 2 (a0;a1), optimal wages are below their e¢ -
cient levels.
ii) Optimal and e¢ cient wages coincide at both ends of the skill distribu-
tion.
Proof. By Assumption 1 ii) and Equation (10), Ua is increasing in a, and
1 ￿
￿0(Ua)
￿ is thus also increasing in a. Moreover, from Equations (11c) and
(11d), the mean value theorem ensures the existence of a critical skill level
^ a such that _ Z^ a = 0, which by Equation (11b) implies that 1 ￿
￿0(U^ a)
￿ = 0.
So, from (11b), Function a 7! Za is increasing on [a0;^ a] and decreasing on
[^ a;a1]. It thus take positive values on (a0;a1) and is nil at a = a0;a1. Using
Equation (11a) and Assumption 1 iii) ends the proof.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is that the government wants to avoid
informational rents, because those rents bene￿t to high-skilled jobs. Dis-
torting wages below their e¢ cient levels is the only way the government can
do this. The optimum trades o⁄ the equity gains of reducing informational
rents against the e¢ ciency losses of distorting ￿optimal￿wages below their
￿e¢ cient￿levels. At both ends of the skill distribution, the equity gain is
nulli￿ed, so wages are not distorted. Proposition 1 implies the three following
corollaries.
14Corollary 1 i) For each a 2 (a0;a1), the optimal probability of being em-
ployed, L(a;wa), is above its e¢ cient level.
ii) Optimal and e¢ cient probabilities of being employed coincide at both
ends of the skill distribution. Aggregate employment is above its e¢ cient
level.
This follows directly from Proposition 1 since the skill-speci￿c employ-
ment probability is decreasing in the skill-speci￿c wage (by Assumption 1 i).
Finally,
Corollary 2 The average tax rate is increasing along the whole wage distri-
bution.
Proof. From the ￿rst-order condition (3) of the wage-setting program, the
optimal allocation where wages are below their e¢ cient value can only be
decentralized by implementing a tax schedule such that the elasticity ￿ (w)
of disposable income with respect to wages is below 1. From (4), this implies
that for all wage levels (except for w0 and w1) the marginal tax rate T 0 (w)
is above the average tax rate T (w)=w. Hence the optimal average tax rate
is increasing in the wage.
In other words, the optimal allocation is implemented by a progressive (in
the sense of increasing average tax rates) tax schedule because progressivity
reduces wages below their e¢ cient levels.
Corollary 3 If the skill distribution is bounded, the marginal tax rate is
positive at the top.
15Proof. According to Point ii) of Proposition 1, at the highest skill level,
the optimal wage is e¢ cient. So, from the ￿rst-order condition (3) of the
wage-setting program one must have ￿ (wa1) = 1. From (4), this implies that
T 0 (wa1) =
T(wa1)
wa1 . Theses rates are positive by the budget constraint (6) and
Corollary 2.
3 Extensions
This Section investigates to which extent our canonical model of optimal re-
distribution with endogenous unemployment is a⁄ected when some assump-
tions are relaxed. It builds on the results of HLPV, HL and LPV.
3.1 Assistance bene￿ts
Our simple model postulates that the unemployed get no income. This as-
sumption is not consistent with the fact that the government aims at redis-
tributing to the poor. It is therefore necessary to introduce unemployment
bene￿ts. However, as the model is static, the government is unable to infer
the type of a jobless individual from her past earnings. Thus, we focus on
an assistance bene￿t, i.e. a bene￿t that is the same for unemployed agents,
whatever their skill level. Although redistribution is made through a high
assistance bene￿t and the surplus of workers is reduced, the results obtained
in the previous section are still valid.
However, the invariance of the results can be explained by the fact that re-
distributing through a high assistance bene￿t has no e¢ ciency e⁄ect since no
participation decision is taken into account. HLPV consider an endogenous
16participation. For simplicity, they assume that all individuals face the same
cost of participation, whatever their skill level. Consequently, every agent
above (below) an endogenous threshold of skill participates (does not parti-
cipate). Moreover, they assume that the government is unable to screen the
search activities of the unemployed. Therefore, the government is constrained
to give the same level of assistance bene￿t to all non-employed individuals,
whatever their skill or their participation decisions. In this environment,
HLPV show that for all participating types, point i) of Proposition 1 and
of Corollary 1, and Corollary 2 still hold. Point ii) of Proposition 1 and of
Corollary 1 do not hold anymore for the lowest skill a0. This is because they
do not participate anymore. The government chooses to reduce e¢ ciency by
pushing down participation because it allows her to reduce the informational
rents given to the more productive worker-￿rm pairs. Moreover, in order
to reduce participation, in-work bene￿ts (if any) are lower than assistance
bene￿ts.
3.2 The extensive margin of the labor supply
As is shown in many empirical studies (e.g. Meghir and Phillips (2008)),
labor supply is particularly responsive to taxation on its extensive margin
(the decision to participate or not on the labor market). Moreover, theor-
etical papers have emphasized that in an optimal redistribution framework
without (involuntary) unemployment, the tax schedule properties are cru-
cially a⁄ected by the introduction of an endogenous extensive margin (Dia-
mond (1980), Saez (2002) and ChonØ and Laroque (2005)).
17The inclusion of participation responses in HLPV is not satisfying since
the elasticity of participation is in￿nite at a threshold skill and zero above.
Assuming that the cost of participation varies both within and between skill
levels, LPV provide a much more general treatment of participation. In the
classical theory of unemployment,8 the employment level is solely determ-
ined by labor demand, an unrealistic property according to empirical ￿nd-
ings. Conversely, in LPV, both labor supply and labor demand determine the
equilibrium level of employment through the matching function. LPV show
that point i) of Proposition 1 and of Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 hold if the
government has a Maximin objective and the elasticity of participation de-
creases in skill (the most plausible case according to empirical evidences, see
Juhn et alii (1991), Immervoll et alii (2007) or Meghir and Phillips (2008)).
If the government has a more general social objective, no analytical result
can be put forward. However, LPV suggest that points i) of Proposition 1
and of Corollary 1 still hold. The most important di⁄erence with the results
of HLPV under a general social objective concerns participation and the tax
schedule. While HLPV show that marginal tax rates are positive everywhere
and a higher transfer to low-skilled workers than to the non-employed is never
optimal (no EITC), a more general treatment of participation decisions ap-
pears to be compatible with negative marginal rates and an EITC for the low
skilled. Thus, upward distortions of the low skilled individuals￿participation
rates can be optimal.
183.3 Ine¢ ciency of the no-tax economy
In order to focus on redistributive issues, our canonical model assumes that
the no-tax economy is e¢ cient. However, this is a very special case since
there is no reason to believe that a decentralized wage setting necessarily
maximizes e¢ ciency. HL build on the framework of HLPV but they do not
assume that the Hosios condition is satis￿ed. In the case where the bargaining
power of workers is too low, they show that bunching at the bottom of the
wage distribution is optimal. This situation suggests that a binding minimum
wage can be optimal.
3.4 Redistribution within skill groups
Unemployment raises an issue that does not appear in a Mirrleesian frame-
work: the redistribution between employed and unemployed individuals en-
dowed with the same skill. For simplicity, HLPV neglect this issue by con-




￿((wa ￿ T (wa)) ￿ L(a;wa) + b ￿ (1 ￿ L(a;wa))) ￿ f (a) ￿ da
where b stands for the welfare bene￿t. Conversely, one can adopt the ex-post
objective that depends on realized incomes:
Z a1
a0
fL(a;wa) ￿ ￿(wa ￿ T (wa)) + (1 ￿ L(a;wa)) ￿ ￿(b)g ￿ f (a) ￿ da
19LPV explains that the adoption of the ex-post objective provides an ad-
ditional motivation to distort wages downwards: a lower wage reduces the
income inequality between employed and unemployed individuals of the same
skill and increases the number of employed.
3.5 Further research
Finally, we expose some potential extensions. First, a dynamic model would
enable to introduce earning-related unemployment insurance. Hence, one can
expect that a ￿dynamic optimal taxation￿version (￿ la Golosov et alii 2003)
of our model would deliver interesting insights about the optimal combination
of unemployment insurance and taxation to redistribute income. Second,
we have implicitly considered that it is impossible for the government to
monitor job-search activity. This is clearly a strong assumption that should
be relaxed. Third, we abstract from any response of labor supply along
the intensive margin. Although the responses along the extensive margin
seem empirically much more important, enriching the framework to include
hours of work, in-work e⁄ort or educational investment would be interesting.
Finally, labor supply decisions are often taken at the household level, not
at the individual level (see Kleven et alii 2009). An optimal redistributive
theory incorporating this issue would thus be more comprehensive.
Notes
1Many international institutions (such as the ILO or the OECD) distinguish among
non-employed individuals the unemployed who search for a job from those out-of-the-
20labor-force.
2Under this condition, the bargaining power of workers equals the elasticity of the
matching function with respect to the stock of unemployment.
3￿ (w) is the so-called Coe¢ cient of Residual Income Progression.
4Introducing an exogenous amount of public expenditure does not change the qualit-
ative results of the model.
5Formally, the ￿rst-order condition of maximizing wa ￿ Ua
L(a;wa) in wa for a given Ua








which implies T0 (wa) = 0, given (3).
6Simulations in HLPV and LPV verify that along the solutions of the relaxed problem,
wages are non-decreasing in skills.
7and making the regularity assumption that the control variable is continuous in skill
8Which consists in standard labor-supply and labor demand curves and a wage above
the market-clearing level.
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